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VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Virtue epistemology is a collection of recent approaches to the philosophical study of 
knowledge that give a primary role to the concept of an intellectual virtue. Intellectual 
virtues are the qualities or capacities of a good thinker or knower. Accordingly, an 
important feature of virtue epistemology is its immediate focus on the knowing subject or 
agent.  
 
Virtue epistemology is prefigured in the work of several historical thinkers, including 
Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, both of whom give intellectual virtues a critical role in 
their accounts of human cognition. However, these earlier thinkers conceive of 
intellectual virtues in a way that differs significantly from contemporary conceptions. The 
central difference concerns which capacities or qualities are identified as intellectual 
virtues. Aristotle, for instance, thinks of intellectual virtues as “states of the soul … in 
which the soul arrives at truth by way of affirmation and denial” (NE 1139b 15-16, trans. 
Crisp). Aquinas likewise describes intellectual virtues as habits that “perfect the 
speculative intellect for the consideration of the truth” (Summa theologiae I-II, q. 57, a. 2, 
trans. Fathers of the Dominican English Province). Both authors identify intellect (nous), 
scientific knowledge (episteme), wisdom (sophia), skill (techne), and practical wisdom 
(phronesis) as the chief intellectual virtues. By contrast, current defenders of virtue 
epistemology think of intellectual virtues either as reliable or truth-conducive cognitive 
faculties like vision, hearing, memory, and introspection or as good intellectual character 
traits like attentiveness, open-mindedness, and intellectual courage.  It is far from clear 
how, if at all, the Aristotelian and Thomistic list of intellectual virtues is to be 
harmonized with either of these other lists. For this reason, virtue epistemology is best 
viewed an extension of earlier theories only in a rather broad sense. 
 
The two contemporary conceptions of intellectual virtue just noted form the basis of two 
main varieties of virtue epistemology. In the remainder of the entry, these varieties are 
outlined, and prima facie promising and problematic features of each are identified.  
 
Reliabilist or Faculty-Based Virtue Epistemology 
 
Ernest Sosa was the first to invoke the concept of an intellectual virtue in contemporary 
epistemology. In “The Raft and the Pyramind” (1980), he sketched a virtue-based 
account of knowledge as a way of resolving the conflict between “foundationalists” and 
“coherentists” about the structure of epistemic justification. In other early work (1985), 
Sosa described intellectual virtues as qualities “bound to help maximize one’s surplus of 
truth over error” (p. 224). As chief instances, he cited memory, perception, introspection, 
and intuitive reason (pp. 224-225). Given the identification of intellectual virtues with a 
certain set of cognitive faculties, and given the claim that these faculties count as 
intellectual virtues because of their epistemic reliability, the general approach endorsed 
by Sosa has come to be known as “virtue-reliabilism” (Axtell 1997; Code 1987) or 
“faculty-based virtue epistemology” (Baehr 2008). Subsequently, Sosa has gone on to 
develop an increasingly sophisticated and nuanced reliabilist virtue epistemology (see his 
2010). Several other prominent epistemologists have followed suit, including John Greco 
(2010) and Alvin Goldman (1992: Ch. 9).  
  
Reliabilist virtue epistemology has been marked by a traditional theoretical orientation, 
with its proponents focusing on issues and problems related to the nature, structure, and 
limits of knowledge. Virtue reliabilists have been keen to argue, for instance, that they 
are uniquely capable of offering a satisfactory general account of knowledge, rebutting 
skepticism, resolving debates about the structure of epistemic justification, and more.   
 
More recently, virtue reliabilists have claimed as a chief advantage of their approach an 
ability to overcome the “value problem” in epistemology, which requires making 
theoretical sense of the pre-theoretical judgment that knowledge is of greater value than 
mere true belief. Their reasoning is (roughly) as follows: (1) the chief difference between 
knowledge and mere true belief is that knowledge involves securing a true belief out of 
an exercise of (or in a way that is creditable to, explainable in terms of, or that manifests) 
the knower’s intellectual virtues; (2) there is greater value in securing a worthy end like 
true belief out of an exercise of one’s virtues than there is in securing it by some other 
means (e.g. by accident); (3) therefore, knowledge is of greater value than mere true 
belief. Arguments of this general sort have been mounted by several virtue reliabilists 
(see Riggs, 2002, Sosa 2003, and Greco 2003). 
 
One challenge facing faculty-based approaches to virtue epistemology is that of 
accounting for so-called “high-grade” knowledge. Virtue reliabilists hold that a true 
belief is knowledge only if its truth is explainable in terms of (or is creditable to or 
manifests) certain qualities of the knower, in particular, in terms of the knower’s 
cognitive faculties. This is a prima facie plausible requirement on at least some 
knowledge. I know that the sun is shining, for instance, only if this belief is true and its 
truth is explainable in terms of the reliable functioning of my visual faculty (rather than, 
say, in terms of an illusion or some elaborate hoax). But consider what is required for 
reaching the truth about other, less mundane subject matters: for example, about events in 
ancient history, subatomic particles, or the nature of moral or religious reality. Forming 
true beliefs in these areas can be extremely difficult and demanding. Indeed, in at least 
some cases of this sort, the truth of a known belief will be creditable, not to the knower’s 
sharp vision, good hearing, or impeccable memory, but rather to her persistent curiosity, 
open-mindedness, intellectual rigor, intellectual honesty, intellectual courage, or the like. 
These qualities—not the knower’s cognitive faculties—will explain why the person has 
formed a true belief.  
 
Virtue reliabilists could accommodate high-grade knowledge of this sort by expanding 
their repertoire of intellectual virtues so as to include, not just cognitive faculties, but also 
knowledge-oriented character traits of the kind just noted (Baehr 2011: Ch. 4). This 
possibility, which has yet to be widely embraced by virtue reliabilists, points in the 
direction of the second main variety of virtue epistemology.  
 
Responsibilist or Character-Based Virtue Epistemology 
 
A second group of virtue epistemologists thinks of intellectual virtues on the model of 
moral virtues, that is, as good intellectual character traits like attentiveness, 
inquisitiveness, open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, intellectual carefulness, intellectual 
thoroughness, intellectual tenacity, intellectual honesty, and intellectual rigor. This 
approach was pioneered largely by Catholic philosopher Linda Zagzebski in her 
landmark 1996 book Virtues of the Mind. On Zagzebski’s view, intellectual virtues are 
distinguishable from moral virtues only on account of having an intrinsic epistemic aim: 
an intellectually virtuous person, she argues, desires epistemic goods like knowledge and 
understanding at least partly for their own sake (pp. 166-67). In other work (2004), 
Zagzebski develops a theological foundation for her virtue theory, arguing that a trait’s 
status as a virtue depends ultimately on the character traits or motives of God. Given the 
idea that intellectual virtues are the character traits of a responsible thinker or inquirer, 
this second variety of virtue epistemology is known as “responsibilist” or “character-
based” virtue epistemology (Code 1987; Axtell 1997; Baehr 2008).  
 
Character-based virtue epistemologies are a diverse lot. Some, like Zagzebski’s, retain a 
largely traditional theoretical orientation: they aim to address or solve problems related to 
the nature, scope, and limits of knowledge. Others, however, treat reflection on 
intellectual character virtues as a way of expanding or replacing more traditional 
approaches to epistemology (see e.g. Roberts and Wood 2007 and Kvanvig 1992).  
 
The latter approach illustrates a chief advantage of character-based virtue epistemology. 
One gets the impression from the literature in traditional epistemology that the goal of 
human cognition is little more than the acquisition of true beliefs about the external world 
via the normal functioning of a knower’s basic cognitive faculties. However, if concepts 
like curiosity, open-mindedness, and intellectual rigor are taken as a theoretical starting 
point, a very different and more compelling view of the epistemic good emerges. Not 
only does such an approach give appropriate attention to the personal qualities of 
knowing subjects, it also makes room for a richer set of cognitive goals, including 
understanding, insight, and wisdom, for an intellectually virtuous person aims at precisely 
such ends (rather than, say, at mere true belief or elementary knowledge). 
 
Despite its promising trailblazing quality, the relevance of character-based virtue 
epistemology to traditional problems and issues is less apparent. The focus of traditional 
epistemology is generally limited to questions about the essential or required features of 
knowledge (e.g. about what exactly these features are, which beliefs have them, what 
their sources are, and so on). If something like an exercise of intellectual character virtues 
is a required feature of knowledge, this bodes well for a traditionally oriented character-
based virtue epistemology. The problem, however, is that an exercise of intellectual 
character virtues seems not to be a required feature of knowledge. Some knowledge (e.g. 
knowledge of one’s most salient mental states or of the most obvious features of one’s 
physical surroundings) appears to be achievable independent of an exercise of any 
intellectual character virtues. Such knowledge is rather a kind of automatic or default 
product of the routine functioning of the knower’s cognitive faculties. But if something 
like an exercise of intellectual character virtues is not a conceptual requirement on 
knowledge, it becomes unclear how or why an appeal to such traits will be of use to 
epistemologists interested in addressing traditional problems and issues (see Baehr: Ch. 
3). One challenge for virtue responsibilists, then, is to make good on the claim that their 
approach really does have theoretical purchase within traditional epistemology.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As this overview suggests, there are two main approaches to virtue epistemology, each of 
which is well-suited to explain a particular dimension of human cognition: virtue 
reliabilists have an easy time accounting for simple sensory knowledge but not for more 
elevated or demanding cognitive states; virtue responsibilists have a ready account of the 
latter, but not of low-grade knowledge. It has also been suggested, however, that the line 
between these two approaches might be less sharp than it initially appears: in particular, 
that faculty-based virtue epistemologists would do well to expand their repertoire of 
knowledge-generating capacities to include the intellectual character traits of interest to 
virtue responsibilists. 
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